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Essay
An Essay Concerning Toleration
Suzanna Sherry*
Where there is no vision, the people perish1
For over three decades, judges, lawyers, and legal scholars
have been taking rights seriously. Definitions, limitations, andjustifications of individual rights have dominated the field of
constitutional law. The obstacles to achievement of a rights-
based legal system-majoritarianism, community values, and a
focus on the concrete rather than the abstract-have been dis-
credited more or less successfully.2 Governmental neutrality
on moral choices and a pervasive, liberal moral relativism are
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. Proverbs 29:18.
2. For a review of the literature constructing a rights-based morality and
refuting opposing concepts, see Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice
in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 563-74 (1986). The seminal
defense of rights theory is DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). See
also Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric of "Rights," 33 UCLA L. REv. 977, 977-78(1986) (suggesting that "[t]he language of 'rights' has become the rhetoric of
choice in our society for asserting moral and legal claims"). On majoritarian-
ism, see, for example, A. BICKEL, THE SuPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PRO-
GRESS 83-84, 111-17, 151-59 (1970); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 63-69(1980); Bishin, Judicial Review in Democratic Theory, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1099,
1112-17 (1977); Sherry, Issue Manipulation by the Burger Court. Saving The
Community From Itself, 70 MINN. L. REv. 611, 612-16 (1985). The rejection of
community values usually takes the form of advocating governmental neutral-
ity toward individual value choices. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN
THE LIBERAL STATE 10-12 (1980); Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRI
VATE MORALITY 113, 142 (S. Hampshire ed. 1978); Richards, Human Rights
and Moral Ideals: An Essay on the Moral Theory of Liberalism, 5 Soc. THE-
ORY & PRAc. 461, 461, 468-83 (1980). The rejection of concreteness in favor of
abstraction is inherent in any theory of rights. Rights adhere to persons in
general, not to specific persons, and thus rights theory treats individuals as "ci-
phers." Cf Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 623 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (implic-
itly accusing the majority of treating people as "ciphers"). In the judicial
arena, the dominant achievement of the Warren Court may be characterized
as the practical implementation of rights theory. See G.E. WHITE, EARL WAR-
REN: A PUBLIC LIFE 356-57 (1982); Lewis, Foreword to THE BURGER COURT
THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T at vii (V. Blasi ed. 1983).
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now the legal, if sometimes judicially imposed, norm.3
The focus on individual rights has substantially trans-
formed and improved many aspects of our society. Antidis-
crimination law is based largely on notions of individual rights.
The increased protection of freedom of expression is a reflec-
tion of the increased protection of individual rights generally.
Many of the procedural protections accorded criminal defend-
ants rest on a determination that individual rights must out-
weigh the societal interest in convictions. A whole panoply of
rights involving intimate individual and familial decisions has
been created. We have, in short, become a more just and hu-
mane society as a result of taking rights seriously.
4
The rights revolution, however, has also had an adverse ef-
fect on society. In rejecting community values and using an en-
tirely abstract method of discourse, rights theory has created a
moral vacuum with serious practical consequences. Rights dis-
course discourages a morality of aspiration. "Thinking in terms
of rights . . .encourages us to think about what constrains us
from doing what we want, not what obligates us to do what we
ought."5 Because rights adhere to individuals, the rights model
also encourages selfishness rather than altruism or community-
mindedness. Rights discourse thus constricts our opportunity
to educate our moral sensibilities and to become less self-re-
garding and more connected to a community of others.6 We
3. Individual rights are clearly dependent upon government neutrality
on moral choices. See, e.g., A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY OF
MORAL THEORY 133 (1981) ("[T]he variety and heterogeneity of human goods
is such that their pursuit cannot be reconciled in any single moral order and
that consequently any social order which... enforces the hegemony of one set
of goods over all others is bound to turn into a straightjacket. .. ."); see also
text accompanying notes 39-44.
4. Often the limitations on these beneficial doctrines also derive from no-
tions of individual rights, either because there are limits on what constitutes a
right or because competing rights are involved. See generally Freeman, Legiti-
mizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052-57 (1978) (sug-
gesting that under current doctrine, equal protection rights are limited to "vic-
tim's" rights to be free from the actions of individual "perpetrators" and that
this limitation results in the basic failure of antidiscrimination doctrine).
5. Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia, 30 U. MICH.
QUAD. NOTES 33, 37 (Winter 1986).
6. See id. at 39 ("A community that attempts to unite itself largely in
terms of the rights each citizen has against the whole has little to stimulate in
each citizen concern for the others."); see also Schneider, Moral Discourse in
Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1819-22 (1985) (suggesting that family law
has changed from prescribing "a standard of behavior not readily attainable"
to enforcing "minimal responsibility").
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have, in short, lost our virtue.7
Perhaps the loss of virtue is outweighed by the gains in in-
dividual freedom. It is difficult-and beyond the scope of this
essay-to compare an unhappy but moral life with a happy
amoral one. Were the moral vacuum the only dark side of the
triumph of the rights model, the danger of continued adherence
to pure theories of individual rights would be minimal. Unfor-
tunately, the practical consequence-because not only nature
abhors a vacuum-is that religious fundamentalists and other
members of the new right have rushed in to fill the gap.8 Legal
7. For a broad historical description of this loss of virtue, see A.
MACINTYRE, supra note 3. For a similar description of American history, see
J. DIGGINs, THE LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLiTICs: VIRTUE, SELF-INTEREST,
AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM (1984).
8. One recent conservative tract, explicitly seeking to help fundamental-
ist Christians become more politically influential, notes both the vacuum left
by rights theory and the potential for Christianity to fill it:
[Miorality today is increasingly viewed as a matter of who decides,
rather than what is decided. That is, the act of choosing, rather than
what is chosen, has become for many the decisive ethical issue.
The fact of the matter is, Christianity filled a seldom-noticed vac-
uum in the political science of the founding fathers. This vacuum
may be described as moral ....
Eastland, The Politics of Morality and Religion: A Primer, in WHOSE VALUES?
THE BATTLE FOR MORALITY IN A PLURALIST AMERICA 5, 6, 12 (1985). If the
reader is unpersuaded that such a danger from the right exists, some of the
other essays in this volume provide frightening glimpses of the society the reli-
gious right wishes to create. See, e.g., Sobran, "Secular Humanism" or "The
American Way," in WHOSE VALUES? THE BATTLE FOR MORALITY IN A PLU-
RALIST AMIERICA 37-51 (1985) ("The judiciary, custodian of the secular human-
ist ground rules, has served as a theocratic priesthood which, in the name of
the American constitution, has successfully circumvented popular politics to
realize much of the liberal agenda."); Vitz, Ideological Biases in Today's Theo-
ries of Moral Education, in WHOSE VALUES? THE BATTLE FOR MORALITY IN A
PLURALIST AMERICA 113-38 (1985) (discussing "the deep penetration of a con-
fused moral relativism into the world of American education"). See also M.
ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID'S TALE (1985).
Some liberal scholars have recognized a similar practical consequence fac-
ing the left:
The left has come to regard common sense-the traditional wisdom
and folkways of the community--as an obstacle to progress and en-
lightenment. Because it equates tradition with prejudice, it finds it-
self increasingly unable to converse with ordinary people in their
common language. Increasingly it speaks its own jargon, the thera-
peutic jargon of social science and the service professions that seems
to serve mostly to deny what everybody knows.
Lasch, What's Wrong With the Right, 1 TIKKUN 23, 23 (1986). Rights discourse
can be used (as well as replaced) in the service of conservative goals. Right-
wing libertarianism carries the notion of individual rights to its logical ex-
treme, also defeating liberal goals. See generally R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE,
AND UTOPIA (1974); R. EPSTEIN, TAIaNGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
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scholars committed to essentially liberal goals and principles
thus have two choices. They may commit social suicide by con-
tinuing to revise and reformulate the liberal rights model, or
they may find new methods of discourse.9
Two recent books with a common theme of toleration pro-
vide illustrations of both courses of action. Lee C. Bollinger's
The Tolerant Society: Freedom of Speech and Extremist Speech
in America1 0 and David A.J. Richards's Toleration and the
Constitution1 ' are two variations on this new theme of toler-
ance. Written from different perspectives,' 2 apparently in-
tended for different audiences,13 and certainly vastly different
in breadth and scope,14 these two books nevertheless focus on
the common topic of tolerance and its place in our constitu-
tional scheme. There is, however, one vital difference between
the two books. Bollinger's book is an attempt to provide a new
approach to free speech issues that simultaneously provokes
further thought on the subject of tolerance. Richards's discus-
sion, in contrast, is an example of the exhaustive and exhaust-
ing refinement of the rights model that ultimately does little
more than put new labels on old ideas. Part I of this essay will
OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). For an example of the use of this kind of con-
servative rights model by the judiciary, see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905).
9. The Conference on Critical Legal Studies has clearly chosen the latter
course. Their deconstructive mode of discourse, however, merely destroys
what liberalism does provide, leaving an even larger gap. See generally
Sherry, supra note 2, at 569-74; Boyle, Modernist Social Theory: Roberto Un-
ger's Passion (Book Review), 98 HARv. L. REV. 1066, 1081-83 (1985).
10. L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND Ex-
TREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986).
11. D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986).
12. Bollinger has written before about first amendment doctrine. See, e.g.,
Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellectual Values, 92 YALE L.J. 438 (1983); Bollin-
ger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Reg-
ulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1976). Richards has written
mostly in jurisprudential areas. See, e.g., D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM
OF THE LAW (1977); D. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH AND THE LAW: AN ES-
SAY IN DECRMINALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); Richards, Rights and
Autonomy, 92 ETHICS 3 (1981).
13. Richards explicitly notes that some chapters of Toleration and the
Constitution are intended for nonlegal audiences. D. RICHARDS, supra note 11,
at viii (author's preface). To anyone even slightly familiar with legal doctrine,
these chapters are simplistic and superficial. See, e.g., id at 3-19, 165-87 (Chap-
ters 1 and 6). Bollinger's The Tolerant Society is more consistently aimed at
legal scholars, which might make it inaccessible to others. See L. BOLLINGER,
supra note 10.
14. The Tolerant Society focuses only on speech, and largely on extremist
speech, L. BOLLINGER, supra note 10, whereas Toleration and the Constitution
encompasses religion, speech, and privacy, D. RICHARDS, supra note 11.
[Vol. 71:963
TOLERATION
describe and criticize Richards's Toleration and the Constitu-
tion on its own terms within the rights model. Part II will sim-
ilarly evaluate Bollinger's The Tolerant Society. Finally, Part
III will expand and explore the potential for further discourse
offered by Bollinger's ideas.
I.
Richards's Toleration and the Constitution is the broader
of the two books, discussing not only freedom of speech, but
also privacy and the religion clauses. Unfortunately, it is also
the less innovative, and therefore the less interesting, of the
two. Richards's style and substance are both reminiscent of
many earlier works seeking a constitutional superstructure to
link diverse constitutional doctrines, and his book suffers from
similar flaws.
The first problem with Toleration and the Constitution is
its style. Richards's prose is so impenetrable that some readers
may conclude that he must have something important to say
despite their failure to comprehend what it is.15 Opening the
book almost at random yields the following examples of Rich-
ards's indescribable style:
[Saint Augustine's] remarkable interpretive synthesis of complex
texts, interpretive techniques (biblical typology), and background
philosophical doctrines reveals a distinctively Western style of com-
plex interpretive synthesis, wedded to a linear historical self-
consciousness.1 6
Locke and Bayle give conscience a moral interpretation and weight
associated with their conception of the proper respect due to the high-
est-order interest of persons in their freedom (the origination and
revisability of claims) and rationality (practical and epistemic ration-
ality). We may say, plausibly, that Locke and Bayle assume the con-
cept of the person of Augustinian philosophical psychology: the
freedom, rationality, and unity of the person, which dignify the na-
ture of persons made in the image of an ethical God.17
15. A colleague of mine has suggested that the problem with brilliant
scholars is that their ideas cannot be rational or generally persuasive, or they
would not be considered unique and therefore brilliant. Farber, The Case
Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REv. 917, 919-20, 923-24 (1986). Richards's
book, if it is well-received, may prove Farber wrong it is possible for the most
commonplace ideas to be considered brilliant, at least if they are presented in
the most obfuscating maimer possible and accompanied by copious footnotes to
dead philosophers. See Boyle, Introduction: A Symposium of Critical Legal
Studies, 34 A1%. U.L. REV. 929, 929 (1985).
16. D. RICHARDs, supra note 11, at 25-26.
17. Id at 90-91.
1987]
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* * * *
The specific concern of the antiestablishment clause is that, in con-
texts of belief formation and revision, the state [may] [sic] not illegiti-
mately (nonneutrally) endorse any one conception (whether religious
or secular) from among the range of conceptions of a life well and hu-
manely lived that express our twin moral powers of rationality and
reasonableness.
18
With work, these passages do make comprehensible if unorigi-
nal points: that the distinctively Western style of textual inter-
pretation includes both original texts and later interpretations
of them; that making moral choices is part of our culture's con-
ception of the freedom of individuals, a conception with deep
religious roots; and that government ought not intervene in in-
dividual moral choices unless it does so for reasons that are not
themselves value-laden. Ultimately, however, Toleration and
the Constitution does not reward the effort expended by author
and reader alike. That it does not is due not only to Richards's
cumbersome style, but to the book's substance.
The implicit promise of the title and some of the intro-
ductory material is that Toleration and the Constitution will
present a new, nonrights perspective on constitutional interpre-
tation. For example, early on, in criticizing the pluralist model
of democracy which aggregates the interests of individuals, he
suggests: "There is, however, an alternative understanding of
American democratic traditions that construes government as
properly responsive not only or essentially to private interests
as such, but to a conception of the public good and basic rights
articulated through public argument and debate."1 9 Unfortu-
nately, the book fails to live up to this promise, ultimately of-
fering little change of perspective from the liberal
constitutional tradition of the last decades.
First, Richards is conventional in his explicit rejection of
what has come to be called noninterpretivism, 20 as well as of
the narrowest form of interpretivism.21 He devotes an entire
18. Id. at 149.
19. Id. at 17; see also id. at vii-x (author's preface).
20. Id. at 14-19. For proposals of noninterpretivism, see Brest, Vie Mis-
conceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980);
Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J.
399 (1978); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution, 27 STAN. L. REV.
703 (1975).
21. D. RICHARDS, supra note 11, at 33-45. The only writers who have ex-
plicitly adopted the narrowest form, which requires looking at how those who
wrote the Constitution would have answered the question at the time, are
Raoul Berger and Edwin Meese. See R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE
SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE 77-111 (1982); R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT
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chapter 22 to a critique of all current theories of constitutional
interpretation and laments that constitutional interpretation
"has received little critical attention from students of constitu-
tional law."23 His criticism of those who would read the Consti-
tution as codifying the narrow and specific intent of the
framers is simply a reiteration of his earlier attack on the same
target24 and adds little to the literature. His refutation of those
who would ignore history is simply a plea for the use of herme-
neutics in constitutional interpretation, an idea that hardly
qualifies as original.25 Richards cites John Ely as a prime
example of antihistoricism, a surprising choice in light of their
respective positions on the abortion decisions: while Ely casti-
gates the Court for abandoning neutral principles in Roe,26
Richards thinks that antiabortion statutes violate the principle
of freedom of moral action and are therefore unconstitutional.2 7
BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDmENT 363-
72 (1977); Addresses-Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1,
22-30 (1985) (reprinting an address of Attorney General Edwin Meese of Nov.
15, 1985 before the Washington, D.C. chapter of the Federalist Society, Law-
yers Division).
22. See D. RICHARDS, supra note 11, at 20-45 (discussing legal interpreta-
tion and historiography).
23. Id- at vii (author's preface). In fact, constitutional scholars seem al-
most obsessed with questions of interpretive strategies, see, e.g., Constitutional
Adjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259 (1981) (sympo-
sium); Judicial Review and the Constitution-The Text and Beyond, 8 U. DAY-
TON L. REV. 443 (1983) (symposium); Judicial Review versus Democracy, 42
OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981) (symposium); Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373(1982) (symposium), and the debate has recently spilled over into the popular
press, see, e.g., Addresses-Construing the Constitution, supra note 21.
24. Compare D. RICHARDs, supra note 11, at 34-45 ("Original understand-
ings of application are just that: the way in which one age, in its context and
by its lights, construed these abstract intentions." Id at 44.) with Richards,
Constitutional Interpretation, History, and the Death Penalty: A Book Review,
71 CALIF. L. REV. 1372, 1379-83 (1983) ("[lit is not reasonable to impute to the
Founders... an intent to bind later interpretation by their applications of the
language when ... the range of such applications is often enormously contro-
versial historically ...." Id at 1381.).
25. See, e.g., Abraham, Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory:
Some Common Concerns of An Unlikely Pair, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 676 (1979);
Kurland, Curia Regis: Some Comments on the Divine Right of Kings and
Courts "To Say What The Law Is," 23 ARiz. L. REV. 581, 584, 595 (1981); see
generally Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in the Equal Protection Context
Democracy, Distrus and Deconstruction, 73 GEo. L.J. 89, 93 n.28 (1984);
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 798-804 (1983).
26. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf." A Comment On Roe v. Wad% 82
YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
27. D. RICHARDS, supra note 11, at 261-69.
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Ely's position would seem to be more historically-oriented than
Richards's.
Richards's own version of interpretivism, moreover, is as
substantive as the theories of any radical indeterminist, insofar
as it depends ultimately on persuading the reader that his own
view of personhood is correct. Thus, not only has his critique of
Ely's "representation-reinforcing" theory-that it is a substan-
tive view masquerading as a procedural doctrine2 -- been made
before,29 but Richards's own analysis suffers from the same
problem. Despite Richards's protest that his account of com-
mon human needs is "neutral in the sense that it is proce-
dural,"30 it incorporates a substantive vision of human nature
and human desires into its purportedly neutral description of
"general goods" and "equal respect."31
An examination of Richards's hermeneutic technique
shows that he is engaging in the same open-ended, uncon-
strained noninterpretivism of which he accuses Ely and others.
Richards describes his technique as an "attempt to integrate a
critical political theory of our constitutional law with a self-un-
derstanding of our historical constitutional traditions, and the
larger moral, religious, and political ideals they reflect."32 An
example of Richards's method is his treatment of Locke's vision
of religious toleration. He suggests that Locke equated religion
with ethics,33 and that Locke's toleration of religion therefore
translates into a more general toleration of moral belief in a so-
ciety that no longer equates religion and ethics.3 4 This con-
veniently enables him to get around such sticky problems as
Locke's exception of Catholics and atheists from universal tol-
28. Id at 16.
29. See Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Con-
tradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1092-
95 (1981); Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town.: The Contributions of John
Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1038 (1980).
30. D. RICHARDS, supra note 11, at 134.
31. Id at 137-41 (on equal respect); id at 244-47 (on general goods); see
generally M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMrTs OF JUSTICE (1982). Rich-
ards appears to concede this elsewhere, noting that "[t]he vision [of the good],
ultimately, is one of persons who, because of the effective exercise of their au-
tonomy, are able to identify their lives as their own, having thus realized the
inestimable moral and human good of having chosen one's life as a free and
rational being." Richards, Commercial Sex and the Rights of the Person: A
Moral Argument for the Decriminalization of Prostitution, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
1195, 1225-26 (1979).
32. D. RICHARDS, supra note 11, at viii (author's preface).
33. Id. at 106, 124-27.
34. Id. at 133-40.
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eration.35 Richards's argument here is reminiscent of Tushnet's
proposal to justify Brown v. Board of Education by equating
the importance of contract in the nineteenth century with the
importance of education in the twentieth.36 Richards's use of
hermeneutics is therefore equally susceptible to Tushnet's criti-
cism that equating contract and education is only one of many
possible interpretations.37 As Tushnet suggests, the hermeneu-
tic method therefore places no neutral constraints on constitu-
tional interpretation. 38
Toleration and the Constitution's version of "toleration,"
moreover, is little more than a disguised claim for diversity
based essentially on liberalism's two themes of individual au-
tonomy and moral relativism: the government ought not inter-
fere with individual moral decisions except where necessary to
protect the moral autonomy of others. Richards's central
theme is that protection of freedom of conscience (or toleration
of diverse consciences) underlies-or ought to underlie-the
three constitutional doctrines of religion, speech, and privacy.
He thus identifies a "general constitutional theme of toleration
in [these three] spheres-thought, speech, and action."39
Richards constructs this theme both philosophically and
historically. Building on the work of Dworkin and Rawls, he
posits a contractarian "background right" of "equal respect fot
persons. '40 The link between contractarianism and the princi-
35. Id. at 123-25. Richards's preoccupation with the niceties of Locke's
theories, and his consequent slighting of more jurisprudential issues, may have
a final unfortunate consequence. At the beginning and end of the book, he
makes what appears to be a peripheral argument for more integration of legal
scholarship with other disciplines, noting that "[l]aw, like music, is an inter-
pretive art; its values are more feelingly experienced when its interpreters
bring to bear on its texts humane learning." Id. at 305; see also id. at 21 (intro-
ducing the mistake of disengaging "meaning in law from history and conven-
tion"); id. at 47 (rejecting positivistic conventionalism for its failure to weigh
"other authoritative constructions"). The force of his observation, however,
may be diluted by his application of it.
36. Tushnet, supra note 25, at 800-01.
37. See id. at 801.
38. See id. at 801-02.
39. D. RICHARDS, supra note 11, at 232.
40. Id. at 31, 54, 68-69. Reading the Constitution as protecting rights of in-
dividuals to equal respect is a fairly common argument. See Baker, Neutrality,
Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations of Equal Protection, 58 TEX.
L. REv. 1029, 1079-84 (1980); Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect
The Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 933 passim
(1983); Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107,
126-28 (1976); Karst, Foreword- Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendmen, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1, 5-11 (1977).
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ple of equal respect, however, is not entirely clear. At one
point, Richards indicates that contractarianism is based on the
principle of equal respect.4 At another, he suggests that equal
respect for persons is an independent principle within the con-
tractarian model, limiting the scope of the contract.42 Finally,
Richards also seems to think that the principle of equal respect
necessarily follows from adoption of a contractarian model.
43
Whatever the link between the two, Richards's thesis is that
the principles together limit the government to the role of pro-
tecting "general goods, those all-purpose goods given interpre-
tive weight and point by all persons as conditions of the more
ultimate ends and ambitions of their lives as rational and rea-
sonable beings. ' 44 This is virtually a restatement of the neu-
trality of classical liberalism.
Richards's thesis suffers from an even more basic problem
than either confusion or lack of originality. However powerful
his defense of a principle of equal respect for persons, he never
explains why such a principle mandates equal respect for their
ideas. The missing premise from Richards's argument equating
respect for persons with respect for ideas, of course, is that
treating persons with respect requires allowing them to have
(and perhaps act on) their own ideas. Unfortunately, Richards
does not explain why equal respect for persons necessarily in-
cludes respect for ideas, but instead suggests that allowing per-
sons the freedom of forming ideas follows as a conclusion from
the premise of equal respect for persons: "One kind of demand
must, from the rights perspective on treating persons as equals,
have priority of place, namely, the demand that the capacity it-
self for rational freedom must be respected. If we have any
rights, we must have this right, the inalienable right to con-
science." 45 The central philosophical argument thus becomes
41. See D. RIcHARDs, supra note 11, at 69 ("The Lockean contract is, I
shall suggest, a way of expressing a deeper moral thought about treating peo-
ple as equals: equal respect for persons calls for constitutional constraints
which a legitimate government and community must observe.").
42. See id at 62 ("On a contractarian model .... the terms of the basic
regulative constitutional principles agreed to must dignify the nature of per-
sons as free, rational, and equal.").
43. See i&L at 102 ("The clearest evidence that constitutional law is con-
tractarian would be the salient weight of the inalienable right to conscience as
a background constitutional right, ... for this right, more than any other, ex-
presses the interpretive moral dignity central to contractarian political
theory.").
44. Id at 84; see also i& at 103 (suggesting that American constitutional
law must be contractarian if it does give priority to the right to conscience).
45. D. RIcHARDs, supra note 11, at 85; see also id. at 138 ("[E]qual respect
[Vol. 71:963
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tautological. Richards offers no support for the notion that a
government dedicated to equal respect for persons must neces-
sarily respect or tolerate all of their moral beliefs, expressions,
or actions.
Richards's historical argument-that a background right of
equal respect for persons animated the Framers and interpret-
ers of the Constitution (a necessary premise given the way he
structures his interpretation arguments)-is similarly weak.
After a dense foray into political theory up to the time of the
Constitution,46 Richards devotes a chapter to the "Historiogra-
phy of the Religion Clauses" 47 and "The Jurisprudence of the
Religion Clauses. '48 The former subsection of the chapter pur-
ports to show that the framers adopted the religion clauses to
protect freedom of conscience as the paradigmatic example of
respect for persons;49 the latter purports to show that the
Supreme Court has interpreted the clauses with the same back-
ground right in mind.5 0
Selected examples should illustrate the unsuitability of
Richards's historical analysis to his conclusions. His first text-
based argument for the primacy of religious toleration, and
thus of freedom of conscience, betrays an elementary historical
error. Richards suggests that "[t]he very place of the religion
clauses-the first clauses of the first amendment"-indicates
their primacy.51 In fact, when the Bill of Rights was proposed
to the states by Congress, what became the first amendment
was actually third. The first two proposed amendments, deal-
ing respectively with apportionment in the House of Represent-
atives and compensation for senators and representatives, were
not ratified by the states; the religion clauses were thus first by
default.52 Richards repeats historical dogma of questionable va-
lidity: the civics-class view that "Madison is... a central archi-
tect both of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. '53 This
view is undermined by Madison's notes of the convention,
which show him to be uncompromising, and the fact that many
must include all the ways in which persons exercise these twin powers of ra-
tionality and reasonableness in conceptions of a life well and ethically lived.").
46. Id at 85-102.
47. I& at 104-28 (discussing religious toleration).
48. Id at 128-62.
49. Id. at 111-16.
50. Id. at 129-33.
51. Id. at 67.
52. See 5 THE RooTs OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1164-65 (B. Schwartz ed.
1980) (amendments proposed by Congress in 1789, from Senate Journal).
53. D. RICHARDS, supra note 11, at 114.
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of Madison's key ideas were largely rejected by the end of the
process.54 Richards brushes aside those who disagree with his
history with the deprecating label of "Revisionist Historiogra-
phy" and little analysis.55
Richards's jurisprudential argument-that Supreme Court
interpretations of the religion clauses bear out his theory of tol-
eration-is irretrievably compromised by a piece of fancy foot-
work along the lines of "heads I win, tails you lose":
Often, the interpretive practices of judicial review will be explained
by the kind of interpretive arguments that are, on my view, most de-
fensible. To the extent that my arguments better explain the law,
that will be to their credit as explanatory theories of law. Sometimes,
however, I shall argue to the effect that a judicial construction of a
constitutional issue is an interpretive mistake. If the argument is a
sound criticism of the constitutional interpretation judicially imposed,
that will be to its credit as part of the normative component of consti-
tutional interpretation.
56
In other words, where Richards agrees with Supreme Court
precedents they support his theory, and where he doesn't ...
well, the Court just made a mistake in not applying his theory
correctly. His jurisprudential argument is exactly as promised:
he uses precedents on Bible reading or prayer in public schools
and on aid to parochial schools to support his theory,57 then
uses his theory to criticize precedents on tax exemptions for
churches, legislative chaplains, and creches in public parks.58
54. See F. MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORI-
GINS OF THE CONsTmrUTION 205-09 (1985). Madison's most significant loss was
the adoption of equal representation in the Senate. See Mason, The Constitu-
tional Convention, in THE CONFEDERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CRIT-
ICAL IssuEs 37, 48-49 (G.S. Wood ed. 1973). This loss is due in part to the
nationalists' failure to compromise, a failure they recognized too late. After
consistently rebuffing a proposed compromise of compressed proportional rep-
resentation, see J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 87 (June 7), 93 (June 8), 188 (June 25), 232 (July 2) (2d ed. 1985)
[hereinafter MADISON'S NOTES], Madison supported the compromise only after
true proportional representation in the Senate had failed definitively. See i&i
at 290-91 (July 14). Another important failure was the Convention's rejection
of a-council of revision, by which Madison wished to join the Supreme Court
in the executive veto. Madison refused to let go of this idea, raising it four sep-
arate times during the convention although it was soundly defeated each time.
See MADISON'S NOTES at 66 (June 4, vote postponed), 79-81 (June 6, defeated 8
to 3)-, 336-43 (July 21, defeated 4 to 3), 461-62 (Aug. 15, defeated 8 to 3).
55. D. RICHARDS, supra note 11, at 116-21; see also id at 58 & n.57 (citing
Pocock's careful tracing of republican theory from Machiavelli through the
founders of the American republic as "a form of mistaken contrast").
56. Id at 64.
57. Id. at 150-52.
58. Id at 158-62.
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What makes Toleration and the Constitution an especially
dull and conventional book is that Richards repeats the same
self-consciously formulaic reasoning in his discussions of both
freedom of expression and privacy. In each discussion, he first
unconvincingly suggests that a right to conscience underlies the
constitutional protection, then shows how the precedents either
support his theory or contradict it-in the latter case suggesting
that the precedents are wrong. Moreover, Richards's purport-
edly neutral and principled analysis of Supreme Court cases
reads like a liberal party platform. He supports constitutional
protection for subversive or extremist political speech, for
group libel, for offensive speech, for obscenity, and for commer-
cial speech.5 9 He adopts an expansive definition of the public
forum and criticizes Buckley v. Valeo by asserting that the limi-
tation on political spending "should be regarded as a fuller real-
ization of [the] principles of equal respect. '60 He rejects laws
against contraceptives, against abortion, and against private
consensual sexual acts between adults as embodying nonneu-
tral governmental value judgments.61 Finally, even if this pre-
dictable survey of Supreme Court freedom of expression and
privacy cases is intended for nonlawyers, it is generally superfi-
cial and uninteresting.62
59. Id. at 189-95, 203-15.
60. Id at 215.
61. Id. at 259-60, 265-67, 272-75.
62. Throughout the case survey, Richards makes the same sort of sloppy
logical and historical mistakes that pervade his discussion of the religion
clauses. In discussing Holmes's clear-and-present-danger test, Richards repeat-
edly talks of "shouting fire in a crowded theatre," neglecting the rather impor-
tant qualification that the cry of fire must be false. Id. at 179, 185-87. Cf.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The most stringent protec-
tion of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a thea-
tre .... ."). Richards bases his defense of Roe v. Wade on the assertion that
"[a]part from certain religious or other assumptions not reasonably shared at
large, the claim that the fetus is a full moral person is unfounded." D. RICH-
ARDS, supra note 11, at 263. This assertion not only ignores the large (if mi-
nority) segment of the population that does not share this view, but is also of
less dispositive relevance than he believes it to be. There may, after all, be
valid reasons for protecting even a potential or partial life.
One last point deserves comment. Throughout the book, Richards uses
male pronouns generically. Despite a great deal of controversy over this prac-
tice, it is certainly not a valid ground on which to criticize the author of a book
like Toleration and the Constitution. Richards does, however, use female pro-
nouns exactly once: "Thus, the heretic is owed no respect, because her free-
dom is enslaved by her will and her rationality is at war with herself." Id. at
91. I cannot believe this isolated-and clearly derogatory-use of female pro-
nouns was anything other than deliberate.
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II.
Lee Bollinger's The Tolerant Society, whether measured
against Tolerance and the Constitution or on its own, is an en-
lightening, enjoyable book. It finds its genesis largely in dissat-
isfaction with current theories of freedom of speech. Bollinger
thus wisely focuses his claims for tolerance theory as a narrow
explanation of the value of protecting extremist political
speech, such as that of the Nazis. Indeed, the book suffers no-
ticeably where Bollinger fails to remain consistent to his own
limited claims for tolerance theory and instead purports to be
reinterpreting all of the law of free speech.63 When The Toler-
ant Society is read narrowly, however, it makes a significant
contribution to first amendment literature.
Bollinger's basic argument is that extremist speech is
merely a microcosmic reflection of the demands placed on indi-
viduals by the existence of diversity, and that requiring toler-
ance of such speech is a useful mechanism for teaching the
general tolerance our lives require. He thus shifts the focus
from the speaker or the extremist speech itself (which he char-
acterizes as "unworthy of protection") to the societal responses
to such speech: "[F]ree speech involves a special act of carving
out one area of social interaction for extraordinary self-re-
straint, the purpose of which is to develop and demonstrate a
social capacity to control feelings evoked by a host of social en-
counters. ' 64 This single sentence captures Bollinger's two
subtle changes in emphasis: from freedom of expression as
"unique" to freedom of expression as "exemplary," and from
the value of the speech to the value of the response. Together,
they represent a truly novel approach to first amendment law.
Moreover, despite some flaws in its construction, Bollinger's
tolerance theory does in fact offer an insightful and provocative
way to look at problems of extremist speech.
Bollinger begins by refuting the traditional justifications
for protecting extremist speech. Although some of his
arguments have been made by others,65 he writes clearly and
63. See infra note 90 and text accompanying notes 82-90.
64. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 10, at 10.
65. For example, Frederick Schauer has suggested that "slippery slope"
justifications are invalid. See Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361,
381-82 (1985). Bollinger makes similar arguments in less detail. See L. BOL-
LINGER, supra note 10, at 36-39. Bollinger also echoes Bickel in noticing that
traditional justifications of free speech underestimate the harm caused by ex-
tremist speech (although they reach different conclusions). Compare id at 58-
73 (concluding that the community's response to harmful speech is beneficial)
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cogently, and the chapters discussing traditional justifications
make a powerful argument against protecting such forms of ex-
pression as the Nazi march in Skokie. He has a knack for sum-
marizing decades of theoretical and doctrinal refinements in a
few pages, sacrificing neither accuracy nor flavor. Here is
where the narrow focus on extremist speech proves highly sen-
sible: the traditional emphasis on truthfinding mechanisms in a
democratic society is, as Bollinger persuasively demonstrates, 66
insufficient to explain why extremist speech is protected by the
first amendment.
Bollinger uses the Nazis as an illustration of the traditional
tendency to overestimate the value of extremist speech, and to
underestimate the harm it causes. He first shows that Nazi
speech cannot be considered to serve what is usually identified
as the primary function of freedom of expression-truthfind-
ing.6 7 The "remote" chance that Nazi speech may turn out to
be "true" makes such speech analogous to false statements of
fact; it has no value in first amendment terms.68 To the argu-
ment that even false speech serves the truthfinding function by
causing a clearer perception of the truth, Bollinger makes an
intuitively correct and unanswerable response:
Are the uninhibited activities of groups like the Nazis really that im-
portant to maintaining a vigorous belief that what they have to say is
immoral and wrong? It seems an equally plausible theory as to some
ideas, at least, that to regard them as unspeakable is the best method
of rejection. Like all human activities, dialogue is not invariably use-
ful under all conditions.
6 9
As an example of conditions under which we recognize that di-
alogue is not useful, he suggests the restrictions on inflam-
matory or prejudicial comments in front of jurors.70
After showing how traditional free speech theory overesti-
mates the value of extremist speech, Bollinger turns to demon-
strating how that theory underestimates the harms such speech
causes. He suggests that the real harm caused by extremist
speech is not merely the offense it causes others, nor the likeli-
hood that it might stir others to action, but rather the silencing
with A. BIcKEr, THE MORALITY OF CONsENT 71-77 (1975) (concluding that we
must tolerate a great deal of offensive behavior; the alternative is massive tyr-
anny in the form of government control).
66. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 10, at 56-57.
67. Id at 53-57.
68. IdM at 54.
69. Id at 55-56.
70. Id at 56.
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of our own responses to such speech.71 Bollinger here again
subtly alters traditional views of free expression by suggesting
that communities and individuals define themselves not only by
the speech they permit but by their intolerant response to
speech they abhor. Censorship is itself a form of communica-
tion.72 Thus Bollinger suggests both that there is a human
need to be intolerant as a mode of communication, and that tol-
erance is not always a virtue but sometimes a form of "moral
weakness." 73 Toleration of extremist speech thus causes great
harm by forcing listeners to violate an essentially moral com-
mand toward intolerance. It is this harm that traditional justi-
fications fail to take into account.
Bollinger also criticizes what he labels the "fortress
model," a justification present beneath the surface of the more
conventional traditional defense of free speech.74 The fortress
model is essentially a stronger version of the slippery slope ar-
gument: because there is a strong human tendency toward re-
pression of speech one disagrees with, we need to protect
ourselves from our own weakness. The fortress model posits
that protection of extremist speech both creates a "buffer zone"
to prevent us from repressing more important speech, and
serves an educative function by forcing us to think in terms of
tolerance rather than intolerance.
75
Bollinger's refutation of the fortress model contains in-
sights that are both significant and problematic. He makes a
powerful case that the model embodies a deeply pessimistic
view of human nature: "[I]t tends to postulate a social universe
in which the citizenry is alienated from the government, as
71. Id. at 61-73.
72. Id at 62.
73. Id at 61-62.
74. Id. at 91-95.
75. Id. at 86-91. The argument that protection of extremist speech, or first
amendment absolutism in general, is of largely educative value has been made
before. See C.L. BLACK, Mr. Justice Black the Supreme Cour and the Bill of
Rights, in THE OCCASIONS OF JusTICE 89 (1963) (discussing the value of Black's
absolutist stance). The converse argument, that we ought to resist absolutist
characterizations because they tend to lend too much legitimacy to valueless
speech, has also been made. Cf. A. BIcKEL, supra note 65, at 88 (resisting abso-
lutism on the grounds that absolutist ideas do not endure).
Bollinger's recognition that the fortress model is rooted in a universal fear
of vulnerability is intriguing: if free speech doctrine permits "us" to suppress
"their" speech when "we" are in power, it permits "them" to do the same to
"us." This may suggest one reason religious fundamentalists are so often at
the forefront of movements to censor expression: with God behind them, they
need never fear that potential vulnerability.
[Vol. 71:963
TOLERATION
well as internally from each other, and to induce a posture that
can be unfortunately disingenuous and manipulative." 76 This
indictment of the fortress model is unflinchingly accurate, and
it reflects a general problem with all theories-including rights
theory-that start from an individualistic or atomistic view of
human nature. This is an early indication that Bollinger's tol-
erance theory might offer more than just another version of
rights theory.77 An accurate assessment of the status of his the-
ory, however, requires a careful description of the book's cru-
cial chapter, "The Quest for the Tolerant Mind,178 where,
having identified the weaknesses of traditional justifications for
tolerating extremist speech, Bollinger turns to developing his
own justification. He labels that justification "general tolerance
theory. '79
Bollinger's tolerance theory is built on four critical but
questionable assumptions. First, Bollinger accepts the fortress
model's assumption of a human tendency toward intolerance,
although he is less pessimistic about the human capacity for
change.8 0 Second, he finds that this intolerance impulse
manifests itself in both speech and nonspeech areas, although
in the nonspeech areas it is labeled "prejudice" rather than "in-
tolerance."8 1 Third, he contends that for a self-governing soci-
ety to function properly, the intolerance impulse must be kept
in check, in both speech and nonspeech contexts.8 2 Finally, he
suggests that insisting on tolerance in the limited area of ex-
pression helps to develop and reinforce the generalized capacity
for tolerance necessary in a diverse and self-governing society.8 3
Thus, tolerance of extremist speech is not, as most scholars (in-
76. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 10, at 104; see also ic- at 91-102. He also crit-
icizes the fortress model for other reasons, in a much more unsatisfying way.
For example, he suggests that under the fortress model, judicial legitimacy
suffers because an unelected majority is effectively frustrating majority will.
Id. at 91. In one short paragraph, he implicitly rejects over a decade of more
or less successful scholarly attempts to refute the majoritarian paradox. Id-
Certainly the question of judicial legitimacy is generally beyond the scope of
the book, but this cursory treatment undermines the force of his rejection of
the fortress model.
77. One reviewer has reached an opposite conclusion, noting that Bollin-
ger's indictment of the fortress theory is applicable to Bollinger's own theory
as well. Strauss, Wy Be Tolerant?, 53 U. CM. L. REV. 1485, 1499-500 (1986).
78. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 10, at 104-44 (Chapter 4).
79. Id at 140.
80. Ia at 106-13.
81. Id. at 113-17.
82. IM. at 117-18.
83. IAd at 118-19.
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cluding Richards) have thought, a necessary evil, but rather a
positive force that is "integral to the central functions of the
principle of free speech. '84 What ultimately makes The Toler-
ant Society an exciting and potentially transformative book is
that although Bollinger's treatment of each of these four argu-
ments is less than fully satisfying, each opens up wonderful op-
portunities for further dialogue. The balance of this section
focuses on the problems with tolerance theory as Bollinger de-
scribes it, and the next section continues the dialogue.
The most serious flaw in Bollinger's construction of his
thesis is his effort to link speech and nonspeech. Speech and
nonspeech are linked, he suggests, because the basis of our in-
tolerance of diversity is the same in each case, and thus learn-
ing to tolerate diverse speech will carry over and transform our
ability to tolerate diversity in general. He describes the link:
We commonly refer to [the nonspeech] form of intolerance as "preju-
dice" rather than "censorship," but it is usually stimulated by the
same underlying psychology. What leads us to react with intolerance
is, typically, a concern with the mind perceived to be at work-with
the way of thinking of the person or persons, whether that be political
beliefs or general attitudes or values or whatever one might call it;
and, equally important, with the fact that this thinking is essentially
being communicated by the actions of those who hold, or appear to
hold, these different beliefs, attitudes, or values.
85
This attempt to equate nonspeech intolerance (whether ra-
cial or other prejudice) with the desire to censor speech is un-
persuasive because the underlying psychology is in fact
different.8 6 Bollinger suggests here and earlier that the desire
to censor speech, especially extremist speech, is ultimately a ra-
tional desire insofar as it is a desire to eradicate beliefs with
which one disagrees. Hatred of the Nazis, for example, may be
based (for some, at least) on a rational evaluation and rejection
of their ideas. Prejudice, by contrast, is largely an irrational re-
action,87 and Bollinger never successfully explains how it in-
84. Id. at 133.
85. Id. at 111-12.
86. There is, of course, some overlap: Where a speaker is a member of (or
otherwise defending) a group that is the victim of prejudice, the desire to cen-
sor the speech may stem from the same source as the bias against the speaker.
In some cases this may be rational (where the prejudice against the speaker is
derived from disagreement with his ideas), and in some cases it may not be
(where the disagreement with the speaker's ideas is based on his status rather
than his words).
87. Prejudice in fact sometimes interferes with rational thinking, as when
an employer refuses to hire black workers and thus closes off a fruitful labor
market, or when poor whites identify with wealthy whites rather than with
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volves any rational evaluation of the victim's attitudes or
values. He describes prejudice as "motivated in large part by a
concern with the ideology, or way of thinking, manifested by
the victims' behavior (which, unfortunately, for some victims
means simply being)."'8 There is too great a disjunction be-
tween "ideology" and "being," between thought and mere exist-
ence, for this line of reasoning to succeed.
Because censorship (intolerance of speech) and prejudice
(intolerance in other areas) do not necessarily stem from the
same source, Bollinger's theory that requiring tolerance when
faced with one will foster tolerance when faced with the other
is left without a needed foundation. Moreover, even if speech
and nonspeech intolerance did stem from the same source, Bol-
linger never adequately explains why we ought to single out
speech as the subject of our lesson in tolerance: why is free
speech the "limited, or partial, area in which an extraordinary
position of self-restraint [should be] adopted by the society as
one means of developing a more general capacity with respect
to [the intolerance] impulse?"8 9 Bollinger's only answers are
that extremist speech "causes less individual and social injury
than does nonspeech behavior," and that requiring tolerance
only of speech allows us to draw a bright-line "upper limit" on
what must be tolerated.90 In light of the earlier discussion of
poor blacks. See Hochschild, Approaching Racial Equality Through Indirec-
tion The Problem of Race, Class, and Power, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 307, 329-
30 (1986).
Although an analysis of the psychological causes of prejudice is clearly be-
yond the scope of this essay, it seems obvious that southern whites did not try
to keep black children out of white schools because they were worried about
the black children's "political beliefs or general attitudes or values or
whatever one might call it." L. BOLLINGER, supra note 10, at 112. They did so
because, as Eisenhower is said to have stated in a candid moment, they wanted
to ensure "that their sweet little girls [were] not required to sit in school
alongside some big black bucks." B. SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF- EARL WARREN
AND His SuPREAiE COURT-A JuDIcIAL BIOGRAPHY 113 (1983). That is not ra-
tional disagreement with how another human being's mind works; that is pure
irrational emotion.
88. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 10, at 112.
89. I& at 120-21. A minor problem with The Tolerant Society is Bollin-
ger's tendency to repeat himself; the quotation in the text is repeated in barely
altered form at pages 142-43.
90. Id. at 124. He later seems to recant his reliance on differences in the
amount of harm, stating that no line can be drawn "on the basis of a difference
in the degree of harm generally sustained when speech and nonspeech acts are
tolerated." Id. at 209. Instead, he suggests that there is a difference in kind
between speech and nonspeech acts and reverses the ordinary description of
the difference; he contends that nonspeech acts have a greater communicative
impact and therefore evoke a stronger need to respond. Id. at 209-11. The
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traditional justifications, this explanation for the uniqueness of
speech is disappointing. In rejecting the traditional justifica-
tions, Bollinger accuses proponents of the classical model of un-
derestimating the individual and social harm that speech causes
and discredits "slippery slope" arguments, thus suggesting that
bright lines are not inherently valuable. He now appears to
adopt the methods he earlier rejected to answer what must be a
crucial question about his theory.
The Tolerant Society is disappointing in another way. De-
spite repeated intimations that there are limits to tolerance, 91
Bollinger, like Richards, 92 ultimately applauds virtually all cur-
rent Supreme Court doctrine, including protection of the Nazi
march through Skokie.93 His failure to give any examples of
the limits of tolerance, or any instances in which tolerance the-
ory yields results that differ from those suggested by more
traditional theories, detracts from the very real contribution
tolerance theory might make. Tolerance theory becomes just
another explanation for judicial behavior, rather than a poten-
tially useful tool for solving free speech dilemmas.
Overall, these weaknesses do not detract significantly from
the book's value and are perhaps the inevitable result of the de-
mands of current legal scholarship. Bollinger has suggested a
truly novel perspective on what might be termed "marginal"
free speech cases: those instances of protected political expres-
sion far from the core values of the first amendment. By focus-
ing on society's response to extremist speech rather than on the
speech itself, Bollinger has opened a new avenue for discussion.
He neither rests content having issued the invitation for fur-
ther dialogue, however, or offers any in-depth application of his
theory to a particular area. Instead, he overstates both the ped-
igree and the implications of tolerance theory. He tries to ar-
gue in Chapter Five ("The Internal Dialectic of Tolerance")
that intimations of his tolerance theory appear in the work of
both Holmes and Meiklejohn,94 and in Chapter Six ("Drawing
Lines and the Virtues of Ambiguity") that his tolerance theory
can be applied to all free speech questions, including content-
neutral time, place, and manner regulations.95
analysis of the similarities between speech acts and nonspeech acts is perhaps
the weakest part of the book.
91. See, e.g., id. at 11, 133, 181, 182, 184-85, 189, 220, 243, 246-47.
92. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
93. L. BOLJNGER, supra note 10, at 176-200.
94. Id at 172-74.
95. Id. at 175, 200-12.
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Both these inflated claims and the occasional sense that he
is trying to force cloture on the discussion (by making all the
arguments, however weak, and tying up all the loose ends) may
derive from the tendency of modem legal scholars to insist on
comprehensiveness. Most law review articles, for example, be-
gin with an extended survey of prior law and scholarship, make
an incremental contribution to the body of law, and conclude
with an extended discussion of the ramifications of the author's
incremental contribution.96 Especially in constitutional schol-
arship, books, like Bollinger's and Richards's, must provide an
integrative theory.97 The Tolerant Society ends with a plea that
first amendment scholarship change its focus from concern
with narrow doctrinal issues to examining free speech princi-
ples as "part of a general social ethic."98 This, like the best of
the remainder of the book, is an invitation to discourse; let us
continue the dialogue without demanding finality.
III.
Ultimately, neither Bollinger nor Richards strays far
enough from the liberal tradition to offer tolerance theory as a
serious substitute for individual rights theories. Richards, de-
spite his opening genuflection to an alternative, less individual-
ist paradigm,99 adopts an atomistic view of society. It is
primarily because individuals are independent and self-suffi-
cient originators of their own ideas and beliefs that they are en-
titled to respect for those beliefs. Toleration and the
Constitution thus denies that community values both shape and
reflect individual values, contending instead that individual be-
liefs exist free of cultural contexts. Richards's vision of a toler-
ant society is identical to the archetypal liberal society
described by Kent Greenawalt: "a set of procedures for making
political decisions, [which has] nothing to say about why people
96. For criticism of the style and content of law review articles, see No-
wak, Woe Unto You, Law Reviews, 27 ARiz. L. REV. 317 (1985) (reiterating Ro-
dell's criticisms in Goodbye to Law Reviews-Revisited); Rodell, Goodbye to
Law Reviews-Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279 (1962) ("[lIt is in the law reviews
that a pennyworth of content is most frequently concealed beneath a pound of
so-called style.").
97. For other examples of gems of ideas that are less persuasive when en-
larged into comprehensive theories, see J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL PoLIcAL PROcESS (1980); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
(1980); M. PERRY, THE CONsTITuTIoN, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(1982).
98. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 10, at 247-48.
99. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
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support the political positions they do."10 0 Toleration and the
Constitution adheres to this tradition and merely contends,
rather unpersuasively, that tolerance is a necessary part of
those procedures.
Richards's commitment to this highly individualist para-
digm is evident in his advocacy of an "ethical impartiality of
one's moral sense . . . deepened by . . . reflective detachment
from early attachments and experience."'1 1 Similarly, his re-
jection of contextual cultural influences as a significant force in
shaping individual beliefs is illustrated by his distinction be-
tween school prayer cases and cases involving special exemp-
tions for religious adherents. School prayer violates the
establishment clause because it affects "belief formation"; by
contrast, exempting a Sabbatarian from Saturday work require-
ments affects only "belief expression," because Sabbatarians
are "mature and committed believers."'10 2
Bollinger's shift in focus from individual speech to societal
responses offers much more promise as an alternative to rights
theory. Unlike Richards, Bollinger recognizes that individuals
are not self-sustaining, but define themselves as members of
communities. 10 3 Once individuals are seen as inevitably part of
a community and a social context, both self-knowledge and the
structuring of moral values become communal projects. It is
thus possible to envision societal goals beyond the mere protec-
tion of individual autonomy. To the extent that a community
defines itself as more than an aggregation of individuals, its
ethos can reflect more than a neutrality toward individual
goals.
Although this abandonment of neutrality might lead to a
revision of notions of the function of government in a self-gov-
erning society, Bollinger does not quite suggest that one func-
tion of democratic government is to shape as well as reflect
community and individual values. He does, however, ascribe a
similar function to the toleration of extremist speech: it is "to
create the capacities in the citizens that they are admittedly
100. Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MIcH. L. REv.
352, 357 (1985).
101. D. RICHARDS, supra note 11, at 108.
102. Id. at 146-48.
103. See, e.g., L. BOLLINGER, supra note 10, at 68, 72. For a more detailed
elaboration of the idea that we generally define ourselves as members of com-
munities, see Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Iden-
tity, 64 N.C.L. REV. 303 (1986).
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lacking. ' 10 4 This is not such a radical shift as it might appear.
Bollinger defends tolerance solely as a mechanism for produc-
ing harmony in a diverse and self-governing society. He thus
stops short of abandoning the liberal vision of society as merely
a collection of warring individuals, and government as a medi-
ating force. For Bollinger, the first amendment's protection of
expression serves as a way to minimize unmanageable conflicts
between individuals by reducing the friction caused by diver-
sity. Ultimately, therefore, his endorsement of tolerance is sim-
ply a pragmatic defense of liberal pluralism.10 5
The premises of Bollinger's theory, however, yield wider
possibilities. Bollinger's recognition of the communal nature of
individuals suggests, as noted earlier, the possibility that a self-
governing community ought to select and shape its own aspira-
tions and values rather than simply serve as a neutral arbiter
among competing individual visions. In the context of such a
theory-one which accepts shared values as substantively de-
fensible-tolerance can be defended as more than a pragmatic
virtue.10 6 Bollinger's thesis that governmental or societal re-
sponses can serve to cultivate individual habits of mind there-
fore functions to justify improving the virtue of the citizenry
rather than merely its internal harmony. 0 7
104. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 10, at 96.
105. This is still at odds with traditional rights-oriented discussions of civil
liberties, which tend to suggest that although protecting such rights heightens
rather than lessens conflict, conflict is the price we pay for a free society. See,
e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971) ("[Ihe immediate conse-
quence of ... freedom [of speech] may often appear to be only verbal tumult,
discord, and even offensive utterance."); H. MCCLOSKEY & A. BRILL, DIMEN-
SIONS OF TOLERANCE: WHAT AMERICANs BELIEVE ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES 19
(1983) ("[T]he distribution of individual liberties is bound to remain an impor-
tant source of conflict in society.").
106. Tolerance may be seen as virtuous in any self-governing society be-
cause the demands of good citizenship (making choices on adequate bases) are
inconsistent with some forms of intolerance. One might also argue that toler-
ance is a virtue largely because the American community has defined itself as
tolerant. See Karst, supra note 103, at 368. Finally, tolerance is a virtue in
Alasdair MacIntyre's sense insofar as it is a prerequisite to the kind of cooper-
ation that marks members of communities. See A. MACINTYRE, supra note 3,
at 141-43; see also Schneewind, Virtue, Narrative, and Community: Maclntyre
and Morality, 79 J. PHIL. 653, 661 (1982) (discussing MacIntyre's virtue-cen-
tered theory).
107. Bollinger's thesis can also be expanded into an argument that not only
societal tolerance of speech, but also more affirmative societal actions, may be
motivated appropriately by a desire to foster virtue in the citizenry by incul-
cating appropriate habits of mind. Bollinger intimates that one such habit of
mind is a search for truth rather than blind adherence to dogma; he distin-
guishes "the tolerant mind" from "the obedient mind." L. BOLLINGER, supra
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Extending Bollinger's argument in this way also gives more
substance to his rather ephemeral notion of the limits of toler-
ance. Even reasoned intolerance creates societal friction, and
thus Bollinger's rationale for tolerance seems to have no limits.
Once the issue is framed in terms of the habits of mind of a
good or moral citizen rather than a socially useful citizen, how-
ever, there are obviously some limits to tolerance as a virtue.
Tolerance is a virtue to be cultivated primarily as an antidote
either to ignorant, unexamined prejudices, or to selfishness, be-
cause a good citizen avoids such vices. As Greenawalt has
noted, "[A] good citizen has a responsibility to decide what is
right, not simply to vote his preference"; 0 8 forbidden prefer-
ences may include those based on prejudice as well as whim
and selfishness. 0 9 Giving content to limits on tolerance de-
scribed in this way is not likely to be an easy task, but identify-
ing tolerance as a pure rather than a pragmatic virtue is a first
step because it sets the parameters.
Placing more than theoretical limits on tolerance, however,
raises another question, one that Bollinger does not need to
reach. Because the thrust of The Tolerant Society is to justify
tolerance rather than to defend instances of intolerance, Bollin-
ger never has to decide whether justifiable intolerance ought to
take the form of governmental or nongovernmental action. As
Bollinger recognizes, legal sanctions need not be identical to
nonlegal sanctions.1 10 Where the appropriate response is toler-
ance, and government is therefore tolerant, individuals may
choose either tolerance or intolerance; the disjunction between
note 10, at 244-47. This points the way toward solving a number of puzzles be-
yond free speech, including, for example, explaining why it is appropriate to
teach evolution, but not creationism, in public schools. See, e.g., Edwards v.
Aguilard, 765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985) (striking down Louisiana statute re-
quiring "balanced treatment" in teaching of evolution and creationism and re-
quiring that each be taught as theories rather than scientific fact as law
respecting an establishment of religion), prrob. juris. noted, 106 S. Ct. 1946
(1986). The former is part of a still ongoing scientific process of searching for
truth; the latter is an inherited dogma, unchanging and by definition
indisputable.
108. Greenawalt, supra note 100, at 358.
109. A good model of such responsible citizenship may be the family: good
parents "tolerate" grown children who have strayed, both because the parents
try to keep open minds and because they love the children anyway (which
overcomes any selfish desire to have things their own way). This does not
mean that good parents are expected to tolerate and be supportive of any and
all choices a grown child might make. Tolerance is neither based on nor
equivalent to moral relativism.
110. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 10, at 12-13, 28-29, 71-72.
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legal and nonlegal sanctions has little relevance. Where the
government is intolerant, however, individuals no longer have
the same choice of tolerance because the behavior to be toler-
ated will be significantly or entirely repressed as a result of
governmental sanctions. Where intolerance is an appropriate
response, it therefore becomes crucial to determine whether
that intolerance should take the form of governmental sanc-
tions against the speech.
Consistent with using Bollinger's book as the opening move
in a continuing dialogue, it is possible to find in it the precursor
of a solution to this dilemma. He recognizes that people learn
both by example and by contrast, quoting Montaigne on the lat-
ter path:
The horror I feel for cruelty throws me back more deeply into
clemency than any model of clemency could attract me to it. A good
horseman does not correct my seat as does an attorney or a Venetian
on horseback; and a bad way of speaking reforms mine better than a
good one. Every day the stupid bearing of another warns and admon-
ishes me. What stings, touches and arouses us better than what
pleases."1
Bollinger goes on to note that this "healthy recoiling" from ex-
tremist speech is not the only possible reaction. He thus leaves
unanswered the question why the government response to ex-
tremist speech ought to proceed as if listening to extremist
speech will always cause the hearer to recoil rather than to be-
lieve. 1 2 The answer lies in the value of nonlegislative re-
sponses. Where the government tolerates abhorrent speech,
the process of learning by contrast rather than example may be
enhanced through nonlegislative methods that point out the ab-
horrent nature of the speech. In other words, if government
111. Id at 132 (quoting Montaigne's Of the Art of Discussion). Daniel Far-
ber has also suggested that this recoil reaction is a reason for protecting ex-
tremist speech. Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse: An Essay on Professor
Bicke Justice Harlan, and the Enduring Significance of Cohen v. California,
1980 DUKE L.J. 283, 301-02. Farber, however, uses the recoil reaction as a posi-
tive reason for allowing the speech, whereas Bollinger uses it only to suggest
that it is not necessary to suppress the speech. See id; L. BOLLINGER, supra
note 10, at 132. In other words, Farber relies primarily on the negative reac-
tion to the speech, while Bollinger relies primarily on the positive reaction to
governmental tolerance. Both reactions educate the citizens, but teach differ-
ent lessons: Farber's lesson is substantive rejection of some ideas, and Bollin-
ger's is the general habit of tolerance.
112. Bollinger's failure to justify the assumption that abhorrent speech will
disgust rather than persuade is not a serious omission in the context of his ar-
gument. His theory rests primarily on the "tolerance-creating" response,
rather than on more specific responses such as disgust or persuasion. See
supra note 111.
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permits intolerable speech but either the government (through
education) or individuals demonstrate how the speech is intol-
erable, the Montaigneian recoil is more likely to occur. o
A concrete illustration of this configuration may be found
in the current debates over pornography. Except for zoning or-
dinances, there has still been no successful legislation restrict-
ing nonobscene pornography. 113 Attitudes toward pornography
are changing, however, largely as a result of the educative ef-
forts of feminists and others who have highlighted how pornog-
raphy degrades women. Examples of this change in attitude
include all strata of society. It has now become acceptable, as it
was not in the past, for scholars to suggest censorship of por-
nography.114 Stores in many areas have stopped selling porno-
graphic magazines. 115 Many political liberals and feminists,
who often opposed attempts by traditional moralists to censor
pornography, are reexamining their defense of pornography.
Governmental tolerance coupled with a principled defense of
the reasons for intolerance is thus a valid course of action in
practice as well as in theory.
The combination of governmental tolerance and this educa-
tive form of societal intolerance is unlike the traditional liberal
view toward free speech in several ways. Many liberals do
agree that social sanctions may be imposed on speech even
where legislative sanctions cannot be. The underlying premise
is that only government must remain neutral. Under this ver-
sion of Bollinger's tolerance theory, however, there is no reason
113. Such legislation, modeled on Catherine MacKinnon's work, has been
tried unsuccessfully in Minneapolis where it was vetoed by the mayor, in Indi-
anapolis where it was invalidated by the courts, and in Cambridge where it
was rejected by the voters. Governmental sanctions have thus never been
imposed.
114. See, e.g., Sunstein, Notes on Pornography and the First Amendmen 4
LAw & INEQUALITY 28, 37 (1986) (defending antipornography legislation); Sun-
stein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 626-27 (de-
fending antipornography legislation).
115. See N.Y. Times, July 4, 1986, § A, at 6, col. 1 (reporting plans of 7-
Eleven stores to discontinue sales of Playboy and Penthouse magazines).
There is, of course, some controversy about whether the stores' decisions re-
sulted from a change in attitudes, or the threat of government sanctions. See
id; Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Meese, 639 F. Supp. 581, 588 (D.D.C. 1986) (en-
joining the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography from including
names of corporations selling pornographic material in the Commission's final
report). The stores' adherence to their decisions to halt sales after the threat
that the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography would publish
names of corporations selling pornographic materials in their final report was
removed, Playboy Enters., Inc., 639 F. Supp. at 588, suggests at least some
change in attitude.
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for the government to remain neutral; it need only permit the
speech, not condone it through silence.116 This envisions a
more active role for government than does the rights model.
Moreover, the underlying framework of the rights model un-
dermines the utility of nonlegislative sanctions, because individ-
uals are encouraged to think in terms of what they and others
have a right to do and are thus less deterred or educated by
nongovernmental intolerance. 117 Tolerance theory, in contrast,
suggests governmental tolerance not because intolerance would
interfere with individual rights but rather because in combina-
tion with societal intolerance, governmental tolerance is the
course most likely to produce the result of a virtuous citizenry.
Individuals are thus encouraged to think in terms of virtue,
rather than rights.
This essay has suggested, through review of two recent
works, how toleration theory can and cannot be used to provide
a viable alternative to both moribund liberal ideas and the in-
creasingly successful program of the new religious right. The
interpretations of Bollinger's thesis, variations on his theme,
are meant only as the next part of the fugue; further variations
are expressly invited.
116. The caselaw on abortion provides an example of this type of bifur-
cated governmental reaction. The government must permit abortions, Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973), but it may discourage them by paying for child-
birth but not abortions. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). This is
not to suggest that intolerance of abortion is justified in the first place, but
only to suggest that where intolerance is an appropriate reaction, it may take
this form of governmental nonneutrality.
117. An example is smokers, who often react hostilely to any requests not
to pollute other people's air; their response is likely to be that they have a
"right" to smoke.
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